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The diffusion of information technology promises to enable the sharing of
larger and finer amounts of information. By reducing information asymmetries
between borrowers and banks and between banks lending to the same borrower,
information sharing is expected to reduce market segmentation and to enhance
access to credit for creditworthy borrowers (Padilla and Pagano 1997).
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Information sharing, however, is also known to increase competition in
credit markets (Pagano and Jappelli 1993; Padilla and Pagano 1997). For this
reason, banks may not necessarily agree to share information about their clients,
and private solutions for sharing information, such as credit bureaus, may not
emerge. Public credit registries, to which banks must provide information, are
considered a valid substitute (Jappelli and Pagano 2002).
Public credit registries are common across the world and have a variety of
designs. Lenders are often required to provide not only any negative information
about borrowers, such as delinquencies and defaults, but also information
about loans in good standing, including borrowers’credit ratings.1 Surprisingly,
in existing cross-country studies, evidence that the adoption of public credit
registries affects the supply of credit is ambiguous (Djankov, Mcliesh, and
Shleifer 2007; Peria and Singh 2014).
We show that banks have incentives to manipulate private information
included in their borrower credit ratings before sharing it, and that this limits the
positive effects of information sharing on the allocation of credit. Using a unique
feature on the timing of the information released, provided by the expansion
of the public credit registry in Argentina, we show that banks downgrade
their high-quality borrowers before disclosing the rating information in order
to safeguard their informational monopoly. Banks also tend to upgrade low-
quality borrowers with multiple lenders to avoid creditors runs, which could
impair the borrower’s financial situation and ability to repay any loan.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to highlight that banks’
incentives may impair the effectiveness of public credit registries. In general,
we highlight that making information public may negatively affect the quality
of information if information disclosure feeds back on an agent’s payoff.
This has wider policy implications for the debate about how information
should be disseminated in financial markets, something we discuss in the
conclusions.
Our tests exploit a unique feature of the Argentinian public credit registry,
which was reformed in 1998 thanks to the adoption of CD-ROMs. This
adoption decreased the cost of distributing large amounts of information. The
way this reform was implemented enables us to observe a borrower’s credit
rating, that is, a score capturing the loan officer’s judgment of the customer’s
prospects (including private information) in three different periods: (1) a pre-
announcement period, before the reform, when banks reported information
to the Central Bank, but expected the credit ratings to remain private; (2) an
interim period following the reform announcement inApril 1998, but preceding
its implementation in July 1998; and (3) a post-expansion period following
the implementation of the reform, when information about the borrowers’
1 With the introduction of the Basel II framework, lenders use internal ratings to determine capital requirements.
The ratings disclosed in public credit registries typically are different from the Basel II ratings used for capital
requirements.
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credit ratings was actually shared.2 We can thus ask whether banks abnormally
modified their borrowers’ credit ratings in the interim period after the reform
announcement but before having to share the information with other banks. By
focusing on the interim period, we are able to isolate a bank’s manipulation of
credit ratings from learning from the disclosure of other banks.
Existing theories help us to formulate hypotheses on the direction in which
banks would have incentives to manipulate borrowers’ credit ratings. These
hypotheses allow us to test whether banks indeed manipulate ratings to conceal
their risk assessment of borrowers from competitors.
The first set of tests we perform builds on the influential papers of Sharpe
(1990) and Rajan (1992), who show that banks may have an informational
monopoly on their high-quality clients. High-quality borrowers may be
“informationally” captured by their lending banks because they face difficulties
in conveying information about their creditworthiness to other lenders. These
effects have been widely documented in the literature even for firms close to the
initial public offering stage (Schenone 2010) and are expected to be stronger
for borrowers that entertain exclusive relationships with their banks.
Under these conditions, we expect that public credit registries, which force
banks to share information about the borrowers, should mitigate adverse
selection problems and enhance credit access for high-quality borrowers.
However, truthfully revealing positive private information about borrowers
might erode banks’ informational rents and ultimately bank profits. Banks’
incentives would thus be to downgrade high-quality borrowers before sharing
information with other banks.
The incentives of banks lending to low-quality borrowers with multiple
relationships are opposite. First, these banks do not enjoy high informational
rents because borrowers are low-quality and would have to pay a high interest
rate on their loans even in a symmetric information environment.3 Therefore,
the banks have no incentives to downgrade them. On the contrary, the revelation
of negative public information about borrowers may induce a creditor run as
highlighted by Corsetti et al. (2004) and Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini
(2011). Observing a negative rating for a given borrower, lenders may revise
upwards the probability that the bank sharing the negative rating will withdraw
credit and in response cut their own loans. Thus, in order to avoid a creditor
run, banks should have an incentive to upgrade low-quality borrowers that have
relations with multiple lenders.
In addition to exploiting these theoretical predictions that differ for different
subsamples of borrowers to identify rating manipulation, our empirical setting
2 Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini (2011) exploit the same setting to provide evidence for the consequences of
lender coordination problems on loan amounts.
3 Banks also may clearly enjoy rents on low-quality borrowers because of a lack of competition in the credit
market. However, they do not enjoy an informational rent because low-quality borrowers are not hurt from being
pooled with other borrowers.
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allows us to design a difference-in-differences methodology that further
mitigates any concerns that our findings may be driven by aggregate shocks
that systematically affect borrowers during the various phases of the reform.
Before the 1998 reform of the public credit registry, even though it collected
information about all borrowers, the Central Bank shared only information
about borrowers whose total outstanding debt was above $200,000 and
borrowers in default with other lenders because distributing information for
large numbers of small debtors would have been prohibitively costly. However,
the adoption of CD-ROMs dramatically reduced the cost of distributing
information and eliminated the need for the $200,000 threshold. Thus, in April
1998, it was decided that credit information for roughly 540,000 borrowers
below the threshold would be publicly disclosed. The reform was implemented
in July 1998.
We can thus test whether banks exhibit an abnormally high propensity to
downgrade high-quality borrowers with total borrowing less than $200,000
in the interim period between the announcement and implementation of the
reform, using high-quality borrowers above the $200,000 threshold as a
control sample. We can also test whether the propensity to downgrade high-
quality borrowers below the threshold is highest for banks with an information
advantage such as local banks or those that entertain exclusive relationships
with the borrowers, which presumably enjoy the highest informational rents,
for relationships with opaque borrowers, for which adverse selection is greatest,
and for borrowers in states with more bank branches, which are more likely
to be poached following a decrease in information asymmetry. Similarly, we
test whether nonexclusive lenders upgrade low-quality borrowers below the
$200,000 threshold during the interim period to a larger extent than those in
the control sample.
To abstract from the effects of unobserved borrower heterogeneity, we
restrict the analysis to borrowers whose pre-announcement total borrowing was
between $150,000 and $200,000 (treatment group) and borrowers whose pre-
announcement total borrowing was between $200,000 and $250,000 (control
group), who we show to be similar in terms of observable characteristics
(excluding total borrowing), and perform a number of robustness tests.
Our tests provide unambiguous evidence that banks manipulate borrowers’
credit ratings in the interim period before making them public. We show
that banks downgrade their high-quality borrowers before sharing their credit
ratings with other banks and that this tendency is entirely driven by local
banks, that is, by informationally advantaged banks (Berger et al. 2005).
In the same vein, we find that exclusive lenders, who are also expected to
have private information about their borrowers, are more likely to downgrade
high-quality borrowers before sharing their ratings. Opaque borrowers and
borrowers in more competitive credit markets are more likely to be downgraded.
This is consistent with lenders’ desire to protect their informational rents in
credit markets in which competitors are more likely to poach customers once
4
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information is shared. We also find that banks that are lenders to low-quality
borrowers with multiple relationships have a tendency to upgrade them before
making their ratings public as is consistent with a desire to avoid a creditor run.
As a consequence of ratings manipulation, ratings become less informative
after the announcement of the public credit registry extension. Borrowers that
were rated as the safest were less likely to default before the reform; borrowers
that were rated as relatively riskier are instead less likely to default after the
reform. Consequently, ratings manipulation might limit the extent to which
public information shared in a registry enhances access to credit.
We also examine the effects of the public credit registry expansion on the
affected borrowers’bank relationships. We show that banks update their ratings
to take into account other lenders’ ratings. Consequently, the expansion of
the public credit registry facilitates new lending to single-lender borrowers
with the highest credit ratings. Importantly, single-lender borrowers that
have been strategically downgraded do not enjoy these benefits. The number
of bank relationships of multiple-lender borrowers also increases, which
implies that informationally disadvantaged intermediaries that provide smaller
transactional loans may benefit from the credit registry. These results suggest
that, notwithstanding the ratings manipulation, the credit registry enhanced
access to credit by reducing adverse selection for the most informationally
disadvantaged lenders. However, borrowers that were downgraded in the
interim period do not appear to reap the benefits of the credit registry expansion,
indicating that the strategic downgrades are effective in preserving banks’
informational rents.
This paper belongs to a growing literature exploring the impact of
information sharing on access to credit. Existing papers show that pooling of
information about borrowers’credit histories decreases delinquencies (Doblas-
Madrid and Minetti 2013; Sutherland 2015) and enhances creditworthy
borrowers’ access to credit (Musto 2004; Gonzales-Uribe and Osorio 2014).
All these papers consider private credit bureaus and the sharing of information
about loan repayments. While the sharing of information about borrower
quality is contemplated by existing theories (e.g., Padilla and Pagano 1997)
and common in public credit registries across the world (Powell et al. 2004;
Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano 2009), there is scarce empirical evidence on the
effects of this dimension of information sharing.
Liberti, Seru, and Vig (2016) show that, after the expansion of theArgentinian
credit registry, a large international lender made some use of other banks’
ratings for credit allocation and organizational design. This is consistent
with our findings. Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini (2011) also exploit the
same expansion of the Argentinian public credit registry as we do and show
that, before the public release of information, fearing a creditor run, lenders
strategically decreased their credit exposure to low-quality borrowers with
multiple bank relations. We highlight that lenders strategically manipulate the
information they release, a complementary strategic effect of the public release
5
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of information, which is important for an effective design of public credit
registries.
Our findings are also important for the growing literature exploring the role
of credit ratings in the financial system and the incentives of credit rating
agencies. Existing literature has highlighted that because of competition among
credit rating agencies and conflicts of interest arising from credit agencies being
paid by issuers, credit ratings may overstate issuers’ creditworthiness (see, for
instance, Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro 2012; Efing and Hau 2015; Griffin,
Nickerson, and Tang 2013). Others have shown that banks may understate
credit risk in order to be able to securitize (Rajan, Seru, and Vig 2010, 2015)
or lower their Basel II capital requirements (Carey 2012; Plosser and Santos
2014; Begley, Purnanandam, and Zheng 2015). We highlight that incentives to
manipulate ratings exist also when ratings do not impact capital requirements
because the ratings affect credit market competition through informational rents
and potential loan losses in case of multiple lenders.
1. Theoretical Background
In existing studies, public credit registries appear to have more limited effects on
the allocation of credit in comparison to private credit bureaus, in which banks
voluntarily share information (Love and Mylenko 2003; Djankov, Mcliesh, and
Shleifer 2007; Peria and Singh 2014).
We argue that information manipulation may limit the positive effects of
public credit registries. Even if regulators audit the information provided to
the credit registry, banks may manipulate nonverifiable information about
borrowers, such as credit ratings, before reporting it to the credit registry.
Not only would this behavior be consistent with banks’ incentives but it also
would be difficult for government authorities to prevent because the reported
information is difficult to verify. Detecting any manipulation of the ratings
reported to the registry is likely to be particularly difficult if ratings concern
opaque borrowers, such as small entrepreneurial firms.
Existing theories allows us to formulate stringent hypotheses on the direction
of manipulation. As we discuss below, these predictions differ for different
groups of borrowers.
It follows from the influential papers of Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992)
that banks have weaker incentives to share information about borrowers on
which they have positive private information. High-quality borrowers face an
adverse selection problem if they approach outside lenders, who expect many
low-quality borrowers, rejected by their previous banks, to approach them. This
adverse selection problem creates an informational rent for current lenders and
allows lending banks to charge interest rates higher than the ones that would
prevail in a competitive environment with no asymmetric information. The
same adverse selection problem that allows banks to charge excessive interest
rates prevents high-quality borrowers from reacting to a strategic downgrade
6
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(if they observe the change in credit rating) as claims of being unfairly rated
would not be verifiable by outsiders.
A bank is more likely to have private information about a high-quality
customer if it entertains an exclusive relationship. The informational monopoly
is otherwise at least partially eroded by the fact that many lenders to the
same borrower are likely to observe the same information. Supporting the
idea that firms with multiple relations are less subject to an informational lock-
in from their lenders, Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) show that these firms
obtain smaller cuts in interest rates if they manage to switch to an outside bank.
Furthermore, Ongena and Smith (2001) and Farinha and Santos (2002) find that
borrowers with multiple relationships entertain shorter relationships with their
banks, suggesting that they are less likely to be locked into these relationships.
These findings indicate that multiple relationships soften hold-up problems.
Therefore, exclusive lenders should have stronger incentives to manipulate
downward the ratings of high-quality borrowers before sharing information in
the credit registries.
Existing literature also highlights that different types of banks have different
information about their borrowers. Thanks to their flat organizational structures,
local banks have the highest level of private information about their borrowers
(Berger et al. 2005), while foreign banks base their lending decisions on easy-
to-verify, mostly public information (Mian 2006; Giannetti and Ongena 2009).
Similarly, local banks being specialized in lending to a particular region are
expected to have more private information than banks active nation-wide
(Berger et al. 2005). We thus expect that the incentives to manipulate ratings
and to downgrade high-quality borrowers should be stronger for local banks,
which have more private information and should have more to lose in terms of
informational rents.
Incentives for lenders to low-quality borrowers are different. Lenders to low-
quality borrowers do not enjoy informational rents because the credit risk of
these borrowers warrants a high interest rate. Making negative information
about the borrower public may lead other lenders to withdraw their loans or
to increase the interest rate, causing financial distress for the borrower and
impairing the value of the loan of all banks, including the one disclosing
negative information (Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini 2011). Thus, if their
low-quality clients have multiple lenders, banks have an incentive to upgrade
borrowers’ ratings before sharing them.
We expect this mechanism to hinge to a lesser extent on the extent of private
information of a bank. If lenders interpret a negative credit rating as a signal
that the bank issuing the negative rating will restrict or withdraw credit from
the borrower, then all other lenders may want to cut their loans right away
irrespective of their private information about the borrower. To avoid creditor
runs, and the negative feedback effects that these may have on their balance
sheets, all banks (not only the most informationally advantaged) are expected
to strategically upgrade borrowers with multiple lenders.
7
[16:40 17/6/2017 RFS-hhx050.tex] Page: 8 1–36
The Review of Financial Studies / v 0 n 0 2017
Importantly, the incentives to manipulate ratings are opposite for banks
involved in relationships with relatively high- and low-quality borrowers. They
also differ depending on the type of bank and on whether the borrower has
multiple banks. Therefore, any evidence supporting the conjecture that lenders
manipulate the credit ratings before making them public would be difficult to
explain using omitted factors, asymmetric shocks, or mechanisms that involve
the systematic review and update of ratings before their release. Below, we
describe an institutional context that lends itself naturally to test whether banks
manipulate ratings before making them public.
2. Institutional Setting and Empirical Implementation
2.1 The credit registry and its reform
Argentina’s public credit registry was established in 1991 and covers every
firm and entrepreneur that obtains credit from a financial institution. Its design
is typical of public credit registries around the world (Powell et al. 2004;
Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano 2009). Therefore, any conclusions of our study on
whether nonverifiable information, such as credit ratings, can be shared without
manipulation has broad applicability.
All financial institutions active in Argentina are required to report to the
Central Bank the amount of the loan, the amount of collateral pledged, and
each borrower’s rating. Ratings are provided as an integer ranging from one
to five, where one represents the highest creditworthiness and five the lowest.
The bank has full discretion in assigning the borrower a one or a two rating
based on its private assessment of the borrower’s repayment prospects. Ratings
ranging from three to five are mechanically determined based on the borrower’s
repayment status. The bank has to assign a rating of three if the borrower
has been delinquent for more than 90 days or, in general, if the borrower is
considered to have high default risk. Ratings of four and five are assigned to
borrowers that have been delinquent for over 180 days and which have had
collateral seized or are in bankruptcy. These borrowers can be considered to be
in default. Therefore, banks have to set aside more capital when assigning
ratings of three or higher, while granting a rating of one or two has no
implications for capital requirements.
While discretional, ratings of one or two are informative. In our sample,
borrowers with a rating of two have a 21% probability of default over the
subsequent six months, significantly higher than the 3.6% default rate of
borrowers with a rating of one. Also lenders often attribute different ratings
to the same borrower indicating that ratings include private information.4
4 Figure IA.1 in the Internet Appendix shows the within-borrower standard deviation in credit ratings. Throughout
the sample period some disagreement indicates that lenders have private information. However, disagreement is
greatest when the ratings are private, that is, for treatment borrowers in the pre-expansion period. Table IA.1 in
the Internet Appendix formally tests that banks update their ratings after observing other lenders’ ratings.
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Up to 1998, the Central Bank provided, using monthly magnetic tapes,
information about the most recent cross-section of borrowers with a total
amount of loans above a $200,000 threshold to financial institutions and
credit rating agencies making requests of it.5 The Central Bank also provided
information about borrowers with a default rating of three or higher regardless
of the amount of their loans. In April 1998, the Central Bank announced the
switch to CD-ROMs, which substantially lowered information sharing costs
and made it feasible to distribute monthly information about all borrowers
even the ones with total loan amounts below the $200,000 threshold and with
ratings lower than three.
Since lenders could always infer any borrower’s amount of loans from
other lenders from financial statements and tax returns, and delinquencies and
defaults were shared in the registry, the reform made available the credit ratings
assigned by existing lenders to nondelinquent borrowers (that is, borrowers
with one and two ratings) with a total amount of loans below the $200,000
threshold.6
We thus focus on banks’ incentives to manipulate the reported one and two
ratings. Banks should have scope to alter the one and two ratings, subject to
the constraint of not raising suspicions with the Central Bank, which audits a
random sample of each bank’s portfolio monthly. In this way, banks can muddle
waters and maintain their information advantage for some borrowers.
The expansion of the credit registry was announced in April 1998 and
implemented in July of the same year. Thus, the ratings of the first quarter
of 1998 for borrowers with total borrowing below the $200,000 threshold
are the ones that financial institutions reported to the Central Bank when
they did not observe other banks’ ratings and did not expect other banks to
ever observe their assessment of the borrowers. These ratings capture the
financial institutions’ private information. Since they were expected to remain
the exclusive knowledge of the Central Bank, they do not capture the strategic
behavior of financial institutions.
In April 1998, institutions learned that their ratings would be shared with
other existing and potential lenders.7 However, until July of the same year,
they did not observe other banks’ ratings. Any systematic changes in the ratings
of borrowers with total borrowing below the $200,000 threshold occurring
during this three-month period, to which we refer to below as the interim
period, only can be driven by the anticipation that other banks will observe the
ratings. Systematic changes cannot be explained by the effect of learning from
5 The Central Bank aggregated all loans outstanding to a borrower for each bank and made the information public
if the total loan amount was $200,000 or higher.
6 Also, borrowers have strong incentives to reveal whether they have other lenders in the contracting phase to
decrease their interest rate.
7 Borrowers may learn their own ratings when they ask for a new loan. However, if they are informationally
captured, they cannot ask for an upgrade to the same extent that they cannot successfully ask for a lower interest
rate.
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other financial institutions’ assessment of the borrower’s creditworthiness, as
information had not yet been shared.8
Clearly, shocks may affect borrowers and lead to changes in the banks’ risk
assessment. For this reason, we design an empirical methodology that allows
us to abstract from the effects of shocks, learning, and borrower unobserved
heterogeneity.
2.2 Empirical framework
The stages of the reform implementation and the different theoretical
predictions for banks’ incentives to manipulate the ratings of borrowers with
single and multiple relationships and high- and low-quality borrowers allow us
to identify the effect of information sharing on rating manipulation.
We start by considering the effect of the announcement of the reform on the
borrowers of highest credit quality that entertain a single bank relationship.
As argued in Section 2, under these conditions, banks are likely to enjoy
informational rents. To preserve their informational monopoly, banks may thus
be inclined to strategically downgrade high-quality borrowers before sharing
their ratings. We expect this propensity to be predominantly driven by local
banks, which are better than other lenders at collecting information about
small, opaque borrowers and should therefore have a stronger informational
advantage.
We then extend the sample to high-quality borrowers with single and multiple
relations and test that the propensity to downgrade is indeed lower for borrowers
that have multiple relationships and are therefore less informationally captured
by their lending banks.
To control for the fact that high-quality borrowers may be subject to negative
shocks that lead to downgrades, we consider that the ratings of borrowers
with total borrowing above $200,000 were already public. To the extent that
borrowers above and below the $200,000 threshold are similar, any abnormal
downgrades for borrowers below the threshold (the treatment group) than for
borrowers above the threshold (the control group) are expected to capture
strategic downgrades.
Most of our tests focus on the subsample of borrowers with a single
relationship and rating of one for strategic downgrades (or on borrowers with
multiple relationships and a rating of two for the strategic upgrades) without
comparing borrowers with single and multiple relationships or different ratings.
Thus, differential exposures of single- and multiple-lender borrowers, or of
8 Strategic manipulation can achieve the objective of fudging information even if other lenders observed the
history of the ratings. In the interim period, at least some downgrades from one to two might have been driven
by the arrival of negative information. Therefore, potential lenders were unable to distinguish between actual
and strategic downgrades and to offer loans to downgraded borrowers with a two rating at the same favorable
conditions as to borrowers with a one rating. This weakened competition for downgraded borrowers is consistent
with the empirical evidence in Table 9 that these borrowers did not experience any benefits from the credit
registry.
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borrowers with different credit ratings, to economic shocks cannot drive our
findings.
Our identifying assumption is that, within each group of borrowers, borrow-
ers with total borrowing below and above the $200,000 threshold are subject to
similar shocks. For this reason, to abstract from any effects of borrowers’ het-
erogeneity, which could lead to downgrades, we consider only borrowers that
in the pre-announcement period had total outstanding loans between $150,000
and $250,000 and perform robustness around this interval. In what follows, we
present extensive evidence corroborating our identifying assumption.
Focusing on the highest quality single-lender borrowers, for which we
expect banks to enjoy the highest informational rents and to have the strongest
incentives to manipulate ratings downward, we estimate the following equation:
Downgrade1to2,si,b,t =β0 +β1Treatedi +β2Treatedi
×Interimt +β3Treatedi ×Postt +ξt +λb +φb,t +εi,t , (1)
where Downgrade1to2,si,b,t is a dummy variable that takes a value equal to one
if a single-lender borrower (s) who had received the highest credit rating of
one from bank b during month t-1 is downgraded by bank b to a rating of
two during month t . Consistent with the theoretical predictions, this variable
is defined only for borrowers with a rating of one at the beginning of the pre-
announcement period, is equal to zero if the credit rating is one at t , becomes
one if the credit rating is two at t , and drops out of the sample afterward.
In all specifications, we include a full set of time effects using month dummies
(ξt ) and test the robustness of our findings to the inclusion of bank (λb), bank-
time (φb,t ), and borrower-industry-time fixed effects.
The dummy variables Interimt and Postt each take a value equal to one
in the periods April-June 1998 and July 1998-June 1999, respectively. The
omitted category is the period preceding the reform announcement, which
goes from January 1998 to March 1998. The dummy Treatedi takes a value
equal to one if borrower i’s maximum amount of total borrowing was below
$200,000 during January-March 1998 (the pre-announcement period), and
was therefore omitted from the public registry prior to the expansion. We
cluster errors at the borrower level.9
If banks indeed manipulate ratings to preserve their informational monopoly,
we expect that β2 >0. We do not necessarily expect an analogous effect in the
post-period, when ratings have already become public.
We develop the above framework to test whether some local banks having
more private information are more inclined to manipulate than other lenders.
We also explore cross-sectional differences across borrowers.
Next, we test whether a rating of two is associated with a lower probability
of default for borrowers in the treatment group (in comparison to the
9 Table IA.2 in the Internet Appendix shows that the results are invariant if we cluster errors at the bank level.
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control sample) after the public credit registry has been announced. If banks
indeed manipulate the rating of high-quality borrowers downward, we expect
borrowers with a rating of two to be more likely to default before the announce-
ment, when the rating was more likely to reflect the bank’s negative information.
The theories described in Section 2 also imply that fearing a creditor run,
banks may have an incentive to upgrade low-quality borrowers with multiple
relationships. To test whether there is any evidence of strategic upgrades,
we estimate a model analogous to (1), where the dependent variable is
Upgrade2to1,mi,b,t , which is defined only for multiple relationship borrowers with
a rating of two at the beginning of the pre-announcement period, is equal to
zero if the credit rating is two at t , becomes one if the credit rating is one
at t , and drops out of the sample afterward. If banks indeed manipulate the
borrowers’ ratings before making them public, we expect that treatment group
borrowers are more likely to be upgraded in the interim period if they have
multiple relationships.
3. Sample and Descriptive Statistics
We condition on borrowers that had relationships with banks in January 1998
and then track these borrowers through the 3-month pre-announcement period,
the 3-month interim period, and the 12-month post-registry expansion. We
assign borrowers with total borrowing between $150,000 and $200,000 in
the pre-announcement period to the treatment group and borrowers with total
borrowing between $200,000 and $250,000 during the same period to the
control group.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample of treatment and control
borrowers. The sample includes 1,764 borrowers, of which 702 have an
exclusive relationship with a bank in the pre-announcement period, and 2,865
bank-borrower relationships. Of the 1,764 borrowers, 389 (1,375) are treatment
(control) borrowers.
PanelAof Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all, treatment, and control
borrowers during the pre-announcement period with the aim of validating
our identifying assumption. We further sort on the exclusivity of the lending
relationship. Examining treatment and control groups, the mean loan for treat-
ment (control) borrowers is for $113,167 ($135,155), with total borrowing of
$179,517 ($223,562). Overall, the two groups are similar in terms of collateral,
credit rating, number of banks, size (as measured by a categorical variable
assigning each borrower to one of six categories based on number of employ-
ees), and importantly the proportion of borrowers with exclusive relationships.
The proportion of urban borrowers is only slightly higher in the control group.
We find similar evidence that treatment and control groups are comparable
(except for lending amounts) for both exclusive and multiple-relationship
borrowers, respectively. Figure 1 shows that the distribution of treatment and
control borrowers during the pre-announcement period is remarkably similar
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics
A. Characteristics of single and multiple bank-relationships
All Treatment Control
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
All borrowers
n = 8,522 n = 1,791 n = 6,731
Loan amount 130,534 151,450 83,864 113,167 133,000 67,129 135,155 161,300 87,204
Total debt 214,305 216,700 25,743 179,517 179,700 21,550 223,562 222,500 17,543
Collateral 0.63 1.00 0.48 0.66 1.00 0.47 0.62 1.00 0.49
Single relationship 0.25 0.00 0.43 0.22 0.00 0.42 0.25 0.00 0.43
Number of lenders 2.28 2.00 1.21 2.24 2.00 1.20 2.29 2.00 1.21
Credit rating 1.08 1.00 0.29 1.09 1.00 0.30 1.08 1.00 0.29
Size 3.42 3.00 1.88 3.19 3.00 1.84 3.49 3.00 1.88
Urban 0.40 0.00 0.49 0.31 0.00 0.46 0.42 0.00 0.49
Single relationship borrowers
n = 2,103 n = 402 n = 1,701
Loan amount 211,759 213,000 24,137 176,147 177,600 16,903 220,175 219,350 16,798
Total debt 211,759 213,000 24,137 176,147 177,600 16,903 220,175 219,350 16,798
Collateral 0.73 1.00 0.45 0.69 1.00 0.46 0.74 1.00 0.44
Single relationship 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Number of lenders 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Credit rating 1.09 1.00 0.30 1.08 1.00 0.28 1.09 1.00 0.30
Size 3.71 4.00 1.85 3.67 4.00 1.83 3.72 4.00 1.86
Urban 0.46 0.00 0.50 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.48 0.00 0.50
Multiple relationship borrowers
n = 6,419 n = 1,389 n = 5,030
Loan amount 103,923 97,700 79,226 94,940 97,100 65,174 106,404 97,950 82,521
Total debt 215,139 218,000 26,195 180,492 181,100 22,630 224,707 223,850 17,643
Collateral 0.60 1.00 0.49 0.65 1.00 0.48 0.58 1.00 0.49
Single relationship 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of lenders 2.70 2.00 1.11 2.59 2.00 1.13 2.73 2.00 1.10
Credit rating 1.08 1.00 0.29 1.09 1.00 0.31 1.08 1.00 0.29
Size 3.33 3.00 1.88 3.05 3.00 1.82 3.41 3.00 1.88
Urban 0.38 0.00 0.48 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.40 0.00 0.49
(continued)
across 23 industries, 6 size categories, and 24 states for both exclusive and
multiple-relationship borrowers. We cannot reject the null that the distributions
of treatment and control borrowers are equal in Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for
either the exclusive or multiple relationship sample.
In Figure 2 there appears to be more borrowers with debt just above the
$200,000 threshold than just below in February 1998. This may indicate that
borrowers try to obtain at least $200,000 of total debt to have visible credit
ratings. Importantly, however, any ability to manipulate does not appear to be
precise, as some salient average characteristics of the borrowers in February
1998 appear remarkably continuous above and below the threshold, suggesting
that any manipulation does not lead to uncomparability of the treatment and
control samples.10
10 Cross-sectional differences are similar in January and in March 1998.
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Table 1
Continued
B. Bank relationships across sample periods
Sample means
Period = All Pre Interim Post
All borrowers
n = 46,891
Loan amount 126,521 130,534 129,646 124,540
Total debt 221,312 214,305 221,520 223,234
Collateral 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.65
Single relationship 0.24 0.30 0.25 0.22
Number of lenders 2.61 2.28 2.58 2.72
Credit rating 1.24 1.08 1.17 1.30
Size 3.41 3.42 3.42 3.40
Urban 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.38
Single relationship borrowers
n = 11,698
Loan amount 198,213 211,759 206,249 192,235
Total debt 221,834 211,759 212,983 227,066
Collateral 0.75 0.73 0.74 0.75
Single relationship 0.83 1.00 0.91 0.76
Number of lenders 1.23 1.00 1.13 1.33
Credit rating 1.32 1.09 1.19 1.42
Size 3.71 3.71 3.71 3.71
Urban 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.43
Multiple relationship borrowers
n = 35,193
Loan amount 102,691 103,923 103,883 102,020
Total debt 221,138 215,139 224,391 221,959
Collateral 0.61 0.60 0.61 0.62
Single relationship 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.04
Number of lenders 3.07 2.70 3.07 3.18
Credit rating 1.21 1.08 1.16 1.26
Size 3.31 3.33 3.32 3.29
Urban 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.36
This table presents descriptive statistics for the borrower-bank relationships across treatment and control
borrowers during the pre-announcement period only (panel A), and for the pre, interim, and post- credit reform
expansion periods (panel B). Treatment (control) borrowers are those with total debt between $150,000 and
$200,000 ($200,000 and $250,000) during the pre-announcement period (January to March 1998). The registry
expansion announcement (the interim period) covers April to June 1998, and the post-expansion period, when
information has been made public, includes the twelve months from July 1998 onward. PanelsAand B are divided
in three panels following different samples: for all borrower-bank relationships; for single relationship borrowers;
and for multiple relationship borrowers. Loan amount is the dollar loan for each borrower-bank relationship; total
debt is the total dollar amount of loans for each borrower across all bank relationships; collateral is an indicator
variable equal to one if the loan is secured with collateral; single relationship is an indicator variable equal to
one if the borrower has just one bank relationship; number of lenders is the number of lenders the borrower has;
credit ratings are assigned by each lender to a borrower, and are integer between one (best) and five (worst);
size is an indicator variable equal to one if the borrower size classification is equal or greater than three (>25
employees); and, urban is an indicator variable equal to one if the borrower is located in the capital city of each
state. A rating of one (two) represents a borrower in good standing with no (some) potential repayment problems,
while a rating greater than two represents a degree of default according to specified criteria.
14
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The distribution of treatment and control borrowers across observable characteristics before the credit
reform expansion
These plots show the cross-sectional kernel density distributions for observable characteristics across treatment
and control borrowers during the period before the credit registry reform announcement from January 1998
to March 1998 (pre-announcement period). The three time-invariant observable characteristics are industry
classification, size, and geographical location. The plots are for all treatment and control borrowers in single
lending relationships (left-hand side) and multiple lending relationships samples (right-hand side). Treatment
(control) borrowers are those with total debt between $150,000 and $200,000 ($200,000 and $250,000) during the
period before the credit registry reform announcement from January 1998 to March 1998. Industry classification
includes 23 unique industries following the Argentinean federal tax administration authority (Administración
Federal de Ingresos Públicos (AFIP)). We use the classification according to the economic activities defined
in Clasificación de Actividades Económicas (CLAE number 883). The size measure is a categorical variable
from one (lowest) to six (highest) measured by the borrower’s number of employees. The geographical location
corresponds to one of the 24 states where the borrower is legally incorporated. The source of information for
size and geographical location is the Argentinean federal tax administration authority (AFIP). We also perform
two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the equality of distributions for each of the observable characteristics
across treatment and control borrowers in the single lending relationships and the multiple lending relationships
samples. We cannot reject the null that the distributions across treatment and control borrowers for each of the
observable characteristic are not statistically different from each other: The test statistics (p-value) are 0.0593
(0.917) for industry; 0.0636 (0.878) for size; 0.1146 (0.199) for geography in the single-lender sample; and
0.0753 (0.523), 0.080 (0.251), and 0.0931 (0.263) respectively in the multiple-lender sample.
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Figure 2
Distribution of borrowers by total debt before the credit reform expansion
This figure shows the cross-sectional distribution of the number of borrowers for different levels of total debt and
some average salient observable characteristics of the borrowers in February 1998. The plot is for all the treatment
and control borrowers in the sample. Treatment (control) borrowers are those with total debt between $150,000
and $200,000 ($200,000 and $250,000) during the period before the credit registry reform announcement from
January 1998 to March 1998. The left-hand-side axis plots the number of borrowers per $10K bin. The right-hand
side axis plots some average borrower characteristics also per $10K bin including the fractions of borrowers
with (1) rating = 1; (2) single lending relationship; (3) downgrades; (4) upgrades; (5) urban, and (6) large = size
is equal or greater to three (>25 employees). Urban and large are indicator variables equal to one if the borrower
is located in the capital city of each state, and the borrower size is equal or greater than three, respectively.
This evidence provides strong support for our identifying assumption that
the treatment and control borrowers are similar once we subordinate to their
ratings and to their single or multiple relationship borrower status.11
In panel B of Table 1, we provide descriptive statistics on bank-relationships
in the pre-announcement, interim, and post-reform periods. A few striking
observations relate to our study. First, borrowers’ credit ratings worsen, on
average, subsequent to the credit registry’s expansion. However, the credit
ratings of multiple borrowers worsen by less than for borrowers with exclusive
lenders, with a decrease in the rating of 0.18 for multiple relationship borrowers
in comparison to 0.33 for borrowers with an exclusive lender.
Second, while exclusive relationships become less common post-reform,
the average number of banks increases less for borrowers with an exclusive
relationship than for borrowers with multiple relationships, consistent with
11 Further supporting our identifying assumption, Table IA.3 of the InternetAppendix shows that borrowers become
more likely to default in the post-period. However, there is also no difference in defaults for the treatment or the
control borrowers in the single- or multiple-lender sample.
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exclusive lenders protecting their informational rents. Third, exclusive
relationship borrowers exhibit the largest increase in total debt even though
the overall increase in borrowing was modest following the reform.
Figure 3 further explores how credit ratings vary around the registry reform.
Distinguishing between the single-lender subsample (Figure 3A) and the
multiple-lender subsample (Figure 3B), we plot the proportion of borrowers that
have a credit rating of two. We only focus on borrowers not in default, in order
to capture the discretionary nature of the rating process, and track borrowers
in the three-month pre-announcement period, the three-month interim period,
and the three-month post-reform period. In Figure 3A, the treatment borrowers
with exclusive lending relationships exhibit significant downgrades in the
interim period: 3.5% of the treatment borrowers are downgraded compared
with only one-quarter of a percentage of the control borrowers. The difference-
in-differences estimate of 3.3% is economically and statistically significant (at
the 10% level). In the post-reform period, approximately 1% of the exclusive
lender treatment group is downgraded, but the difference is not significant in
either absolute or in relative terms.
Interestingly, the treatment group converges to the control group. This is
precisely what we would expect based on our hypothesis because the ratings
of borrowers in the control group were already public. Therefore, if the
mechanisms we highlight are at work, banks already should have strategically
downgraded some of the borrowers above the threshold.
In Figure 3B, we focus on the borrowers with multiple relationships. The
borrowers in the treatment group exhibit significant upgrades in the interim
period: 2.9% of these borrowers are upgraded, while 0.1% of the borrowers
in the control group are downgraded. The difference-in-differences of 3.0% is
economically and statistically significant (at the 5% level). There is no evidence
of significant upgrade or downgrade activity in the post-reform period. Also in
this case, the proportion of borrowers in the treatment group with a rating of
two appears to converge to the proportion of borrowers with a rating of two in
the control sample.
Figure 4 reproduces Figure 3, but considers only local banks. The patterns
that emerge are very similar to Figure 3 indicating that the differences before
and after the reform are not driven by an increasing presence of foreign banks,
or by local banks becoming more similar to foreign banks.
In the Internet Appendix, we present analogous figures for large domestic
banks (Figure IA.2) and foreign banks (Figure IA.3). As we will discuss in
Subsection 5.1, the tendency to strategically downgrade is driven by local
banks, while all banks appear inclined to strategically upgrade multiple-lender
borrowers.
This evidence is fully consistent with the conjecture that banks manipulate
ratings downward to capture good borrowers, and manipulate ratings upward
to pre-empt runs on riskier borrowers. Since lenders strategically downgrade
some borrowers and strategically upgrade others, the manipulation does not
17
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Figure 3
Upgrades and downgrades around the credit reform expansion
These plots show the fraction of borrowers with a Rating = 2 for single lending relationship borrowers and multiple
lending relationship borrowers, respectively. Statistics are shown for three months prior to the credit registry
expansion announcement (pre-announcement period), during a period in which the credit registry expansion has
been announced, but information about the borrowers has not yet been made public (interim period), and after
information about the borrowers has been made public (post-expansion period). We track the bank-borrower
relationships that existed as of January 1998 for borrowers that did not become delinquent or default in the pre-,
interim, and three-month post-reform period. The unit of observation is at the borrower-bank-month level.
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Figure 4
Upgrades and downgrades around the credit reform expansion: Local banks
These plots show the fraction of borrowers with a Rating = 2 for single lending relationship borrowers and
multiple lending relationship borrowers, respectively, considering lending relationships with local banks only.
Statistics are shown for three months prior to the credit registry expansion announcement (pre-announcement
period), during a period in which the credit registry expansion has been announced, but information about the
borrowers has not yet been made public (interim period), and after information about the borrowers has been
made public (post-reform period). We track the bank-borrower relationships that existed as of January 1998 for
borrowers that did not become delinquent or default in the pre-, interim, and three-month post-reform period.
The unit of observation is at the borrower-bank-month level.
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give rise to systematic rating inflation or deflation and may therefore not to be
easily detected by regulators.
Figures 3 and 4 also show that borrowers in the treatment group with
an exclusive relationship appear healthier than borrowers with multiple
relationships in the treatment group in the pre-announcement period. The
separation on risk is consistent with adverse selection models of credit rationing
(Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Banks that are unable to evaluate borrowers offer
a loan contract that is acceptable only to riskier borrowers, while healthier
borrowers contract exclusively to overcome information asymmetry.
4. Results
4.1 Strategic downgrades of high-quality borrowers
Table 2 provides evidence that treated high-quality borrowers, defined as
borrowers that maintain a rating of one and total loans below the $200,000
threshold in the period preceding the announcement of the credit registry
expansion, are more likely to be downgraded in the interim period than
borrowers in the control sample.12 We consider only the subsample of borrowers
that in the pre-announcement period entertained a single relationship, for
which we expect banks’ informational rent, and, consequently, incentives to
manipulate ratings before their release, to be stronger.
In Column 1, treated borrowers with a rating of one appear 2.6 percentage
points more likely to be downgraded during the interim period than borrowers
in the control sample. This is economically large relative to the unconditional
probability of a downgrade of 0.016 in the whole sample and 0.011 in the
pre-announcement period.
Under the identification assumption that borrowers in the treatment group did
not receive stronger negative shocks than borrowers with slightly larger loans
included in the control sample, this evidence indicates that banks strategically
downgrade high-quality borrowers to preserve their informational advantage.
In Column 2, we test whether the propensity to downgrade high-quality
borrowers persist in the post-reform period, once the ratings have been made
public.Ahigher propensity to downgrade borrowers in the treatment group than
borrowers in the control group may suggest that the quality of treated borrowers
is deteriorating, possibly because of the approaching Argentinian recession,
and should be interpreted as evidence against our identification assumption
that the treatment group and the control group borrowers are similarly exposed
to shocks. We find no evidence that banks continue to abnormally downgrade
the treatment group borrowers in the post-reform period.
To provide further evidence that borrowers above and below the threshold
are not subject to asymmetric shocks, Figure 5 shows the dynamic effects
12 Once a borrower has been downgraded, we exclude it from the sample, which is why the number of observations
in Table 2 is lower than that in Table 1.
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Table 2
Strategic downgrades of high-quality borrowers
Dependent variable Downgrades from 1 to 2
Sample lender Single
Period All 3-month post
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated 0.004 −0.006 0.002 0.008 0.000 0.004
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005)
Treated × Interim 0.026∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.011 0.002 −0.001
(0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Treated × Post 0.013 −0.008
(0.008) (0.008)
Treated × Interim × Local 0.053∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.038∗ 0.054∗∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021)
Treated × Post × Local 0.034
(0.024)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Borrower controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Bank-time fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes
Industry-time fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes
No. observations 9,558 9,558 9,558 9,558 9,558 5,151
R-sq. 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.16 0.18
This table presents the difference-in-differences effect of the credit registry expansion announcement (interim
period) and public information (post-expansion period) on downgrade hazard rates, estimated using OLS.
Treatment (control) borrowers are those with total debt between $150,000 and $200,000 ($200,000 and $250,000)
during the pre-announcement period (January to March 1998). The dependent variable, downgrade, is from rating
= 1 to rating = 2. The sample is all treatment and control borrowers with a rating = 1 in the pre-announcement
period, and with a single lending relationship in the pre-announcement period. Columns (1) to (5) use a 12-month
post-period horizon, while Column (6) uses a three-month post-period horizon. We exclude borrowers that have
been downgraded from the sample, explaining why the number of observations is lower than in Table 1. Local
is an indicator variable equal to one if the lender is a local bank. The unit of observation is at the borrower-bank-
month level. Bank controls include log(total assets), return on assets, capitalization (%), log(number of branches),
nonperforming loans-to-total assets, deposits-to-total assets, and growth on total assets, while borrower controls
include the log(debt), state, size, industry classification, and urban. Standard errors are clustered at the borrower
level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
of downgrades. It plots the coefficient estimate, obtained including the same
controls as in Column 1, of the banks’ propensity to downgrade treated
borrowers in each month. The propensity of high-quality borrowers with single
lenders to be downgraded is remarkably similar in the pre- and post-reform
periods. All differences are concentrated in the interim period as our hypothesis
would predict.
Local banks are known to have a stronger informational advantage than
other lenders, often under the form of soft information, which is difficult to
collect in large banks that are active nation-wide and internationally (Berger
et al. 2005). Therefore, we expect local banks to have more to lose in terms
of informational rents from sharing the private information contained in the
credit rating. Consistent with our hypothesis that banks’ abnormal propensity
to downgrade in the interim period is driven by the desire to protect their
informational rents, Columns 3 and 4 show that the tendency to downgrade
21
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Conditional estimates of strategic downgrades by month for single lenders
This figure reports single relationship lenders’ propensity to downgrade high-quality borrowers by month. The
parameter estimates reported are for the coefficient of the interaction between the Treated idummy and monthly
dummies for each month from January 1998 to September 1998. The parameter estimates are obtained by
controlling for the Treated idummy, each of the monthly dummies, the bank and borrower controls, as well
as bank fixed effects. Bank controls include log(total assets), return on assets, capitalization (%), log(number
of branches), nonperforming loans-to-total assets, deposits-to-total assets, and growth on total assets, while
borrower controls include the log(debt), state, size, industry classification, and urban.
high-quality single-lender borrowers is entirely due to local banks. Column 4
also shows that this tendency emerges in the interim, but not in the post-reform
period, indicating that the customers of local banks are unlikely to be more
exposed to shocks than borrowers in the control group.
In Column 5, we control for bank-specific shocks and industry specific-
shocks by including bank-time and industry-time fixed effects. The results are
invariant. The robustness of the results indicates that bank-specific shocks and
borrower industry composition or seasonal effects cannot drive our findings.13
Finally, Column 6 shows that our results are unaffected when we use a three
month post-reform period, instead of a nine month one as in the earlier
specifications.
While we expect banks to have higher informational rents on borrowers
with which they entertain exclusive relations, lenders to borrowers with
multiple relationships may also have private information because borrowers
13 Table IA.4 in the Internet Appendix further controls for the possibility that treated borrowers are more likely to be
in agriculture and relatively more exposed to shocks in the interim period. The triple interaction term Treated ×
Agriculture × Interim is not statistically significant dispelling this concern.
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Table 3
Cross-sectional lender differences in incentives to strategically downgrade
Dependent variable Downgrades from 1 to 2
Sample lender All
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated −0.000 0.001 −0.000 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Treated × Interim 0.015∗∗∗ 0.001 0.003 0.016
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011)
Treated × Interim × Local 0.026∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗
(0.011) (0.015) (0.011)
Treated × Post 0.002
(0.004)




Treated × Interim × log(#banks) −0.016∗
(0.009)
Borrower controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. observations 35,269 35,269 35,269 35,269
R-sq. 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
This table presents the difference-in-differences effect of the registry expansion announcement (interim period)
and public information (post-expansion period) on downgrade hazard rates by bank-type, estimated using OLS.
Treatment (control) borrowers are those with total debt between $150,000 and $200,000 ($200,000 and $250,000)
during the pre-announcement period (January to March 1998). The dependent variable, downgrade, is from rating
= 1 to rating = 2. The sample is all treatment and control borrowers with a single and multiple lending relationships
and with a rating of one in the pre-announcement period. The unit of observation is at the borrower-bank-month
level. Local is an indicator variable equal to one if the lender is a local bank; log(#banks) is the log of the total
number of bank-borrower relationships. We omit from reporting the coefficient estimates of Treated × Local
in Columns (2), (3), and (4). Borrower controls include log(debt), state, size, industry classification, and urban.
Standard errors are clustered at the borrower level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level.
may entertain transactional relationships with some of their multiple banks and
have a close relationship with a few others.
Table 3 shows that all our findings hold also for borrowers with multiple
relationships. That is, we find an abnormal propensity to downgrade high-
quality borrowers in the interim period (Column 1), which is driven by local
banks (Column 2) and does not emerge in the post-reform period once the rating
becomes public (Column 3). As we would expect, the effects are somewhat
smaller than in the case in which we focus on single relationship borrowers.
In Column 4, we explicitly test the conjecture that the incentives to
strategically downgrade borrowers with multiple relationships are weaker. This
conjecture is confirmed by the fact that the triple interaction term between
Treatedi ×Interimt ×log(#Banks) is negative and significant.
These results support our conjecture that banks strategically downgrade high-
quality borrowers below the threshold to preserve their informational rents. In
particular, any alternative explanation based on borrowers below the threshold
being more exposed to shocks would have to explain why borrowers below the
threshold with multiple banks are less likely to be downgraded.
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Table IA.5 in the InternetAppendix further evaluates the merit of the criticism
that borrowers below the threshold are more exposed to negative shocks.
If a negative shock indeed explained our findings, we would expect to see
downgrades also to ratings that have less scope for manipulation, such as
downgrades from 1 to 3, 4, and 5. We find no evidence of this both in the single-
lender sample (Column 1) or in the sample that also includes multiple-lender
borrowers (Column 2).
The rest of Table IA.5 presents a local sample analysis that further
supports our identifying assumptions. While in our benchmark specifications
we consider borrowers with total debt between $150,000 and $250,000, in
Columns 3 and 4 we reestimate the specification in Column 5 of Table 2
and restrict the interval to borrowers with total debt between $175,000 and
$225,000 and between $125,000 and $275,000, respectively. It is comforting
that the estimates are hardly affected when we vary the extent of unobserved
heterogeneity by changing the sample interval. Also, the effect of Treatedi
× Interimt is not statistically significant in the placebo tests presented in
Columns 5 and 6, where borrowers with loan amounts strictly below and strictly
above the cutoff are considered in the estimation.
Table 4 tests whether more opaque borrowers are more likely to be
downgraded. If banks’ strategic downgrades aim to preserve informational
rents, banks should downgrade to a lower extent borrowers with less
information asymmetry. Large borrowers are more visible and therefore less
informationally captured. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 show that indeed strategic
downgrades affect large borrowers, defined as firms with employees above the
median of 25, to a lesser extent. Urban borrowers may also be more visible
to loan officers. To the extent that they face less asymmetric information,
their lenders are able to enjoy less informational rents and should have weaker
incentives to downgrade them, as we find in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.
In Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4, we further show that borrowers in areas
in which lenders face less competition are less likely to be downgraded. We
measure lack of competition as the number of borrowers per branch in a state. In
states with a higher number of borrowers per branch, competition is lower and
borrowers are less likely to be poached even after the expansion of the credit
registry. Incentives to strategically downgrade should therefore be weaker, as
we find.
The manipulation of credit ratings implies that the pool of borrowers
with a rating of two becomes less likely to default as some high-quality
borrowers have been downgraded. This is precisely what we find in panel A of
Table 5. Treatment group borrowers with a credit rating of two in the period
preceding the announcement of the credit registry expansion are more likely
to default in the following 6 or 12 months than treatment-group borrowers
receiving the same rating in the interim or the post-reform period, relative
to the control group. Thus, on average, borrowers with a rating of two are
better quality after the announcement of the credit registry expansion than
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Table 4
Cross-sectional borrower differences in incentives to strategically downgrade
Dependent variable Downgrades from 1 to 2
Sample lenders Single
Characteristic Large borrower Urban borrower Low competition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated −0.010 −0.009 0.002 −0.008 0.003 −0.000
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Treated × Interim 0.058∗∗ −0.001 0.043∗∗ 0.001 0.026∗∗ 0.004
(0.024) (0.012) (0.018) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009)
Treated × Interim × Characteristic −0.048∗ 0.003 −0.047∗∗ 0.000 −0.030∗ −0.029∗
(0.028) (0.013) (0.021) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Treated × Interim × Local 0.077∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.035∗
(0.032) (0.026) (0.020)
Treated × Interim × Characteristic −0.066∗ −0.070∗
× Local (0.041) (0.037)
Borrower controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-time fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-time fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. observations 9,558 9,558 9,558 9,558 9,558 9,558
R-sq. 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
This table presents the difference-in-differences effect of the registry expansion announcement (interim period)
on downgrade hazard rates by borrower-type, estimated using OLS. Treatment (control) borrowers are those
with total debt between $150,000 and $200,000 ($200,000 and $250,000) during the pre-announcement period
(January to March 1998). The dependent variable, downgrade, is from rating = 1 to rating = 2. The sample
is all treatment and control borrowers with a single lending relationship and with a rating of one in the pre-
announcement period. The unit of observation is at the borrower-bank-month level. Characteristic denotes
whether the borrower is a large borrower (Columns (1) and (2)) or urban borrower (Columns (3) and (4)),
or whether the lender faces low competition (Columns (5) and (6)). Large borrowers is an indicator variable
equal to one if the borrower size classification is equal or greater than three (>25 employees); urban is an indicator
variable equal to one if the borrower is located in the capital city of each state; and local is an indicator variable
equal to one if the lender is a local bank. Low competition is measured as the ratio of the total number of
borrowers over the total number of branches for each lender at the state level. Local is an indicator variable equal
to one if the lender is a local bank. We omit from reporting the coefficient estimates of Treated × Characteristic,
Interim × Characteristic in all columns; Treated × Local, Interim × Local, Treated × Local × Characteristic,
Interim × Local × Characteristic in Columns (2) and (4). Borrower controls include log(debt), state, and industry
classification in all columns plus urban in Columns (1) and (2), log(debt) in Columns (3) and (4), and urban and
log(debt) in Columns (5) and (6). Standard errors are clustered at the borrower level. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
in the pre-announcement period.14 This effect is unlikely to be driven by
business cycles because it is present only for treated borrowers, that is,
for the borrowers whose credit ratings become public for the first time,
and not for the borrowers with slightly bigger total loan amounts. Also, a
higher exposure to the approaching Argentinian recession would imply that
treatment borrowers with a rating of two should be more, not less likely to
default.15
14 In Table IA.6 of the Internet Appendix, we also find that borrowers in the treatment group that are downgraded
in the interim period are not more likely to default than treated borrowers with a rating of one that were not
downgraded, further supporting our interpretation that most of the downgrades of treatment group borrowers in
the interim period were not driven by the arrival of new information.
15 The conclusion that downgrades are driven by information manipulation rather than by the arrival of new
information is also consistent with the finding that banks, on average, do not change the amount of the loan in
the interim period (see Table IA.7 for single-lender borrowers and Table IA.8 for multiple lender borrowers).
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Table 5
Information sharing and credit rating informativeness
A
Dependent variable Default
Sample lender Single and rating = 2
(1) (2)
Default horizon 6 Mths 12 Mths
Treated −0.014 −0.084
(0.102) (0.122)
Treated × Pre 0.273∗∗ 0.175∗
(0.109) (0.100)
Bank controls Yes Yes
Borrower controls Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes




Sample lender Single and rating = 1
(1) (2)
Default horizon 6 Mths 12 Mths
Treated 0.001 0.009
(0.021) (0.034)
Treated × Pre 0.017 0.010
(0.030) (0.028)
Bank controls Yes Yes
Borrower controls Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
No. observations 7,387 4,238
R-sq. 0.15 0.25
This table presents the difference-in-differences effect of the credit rating in the pre-announcement period on
default hazard rates for borrowers with a rating = 2, estimated using OLS. Treatment (control) borrowers are those
with total debt between $150,000 and $200,000 ($200,000 and $250,000) during the pre-announcement period
(January to March 1998). The dependent variable, default, is an indicator variable equal to one if the borrower
defaults in the subsequent six-month period in Column (1) or 12-month period in Column (2). In panel A, the
sample is all treatment and control borrowers with a single lending relationship in the pre-announcement period
and with a rating = 2 in the current period. In panel B, the sample is all treatment and control borrowers with
a single lending relationship in the pre-announcement period and with a rating = 1 in the current period. The
unit of observation is at the borrower-bank-month level. Bank controls include log(total assets), return on assets,
capitalization (%), log(number of branches), nonperforming loans-to-total assets, deposits-to-total assets, and
growth on total assets, while borrower controls include the log(debt), state, size, and urban. Standard errors are
clustered at the borrower level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
One may also wonder whether banks just downgrade marginal borrowers,
perhaps slightly changing the internal cutoff for different ratings. While this
behavior would be consistent with manipulation, it may make the results less
striking and also less relevant from a policy point of view. If banks just
downgraded marginal borrowers, the pool of borrowers rated one should have
lower default rates post-manipulation because the worse borrowers are now
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rated 2. In panel B of Table 5, we find no evidence that this is the case, suggesting
that the downgrades affect not only marginal borrowers but also the best quality
borrowers that are rated one, comfortably above the cutoff.
Taken together, the results in panels A and B of Table 5 imply that default
rates converge for treatment group borrowers with ratings of one or two in the
period of the credit registry expansion. Put differently, we find that the ratings
of treatment group borrowers become less informative even after we include
bank and borrower controls, and industry, bank and time fixed effects. Thus, the
downgrades cannot be driven by the incorporation of more precise information
in the ratings before their public release, because in that case ratings should
become more, not less precise in predicting defaults.
Overall, these findings fully support the conjecture that banks manipulate
the credit ratings in order to protect their informational rents.
4.2 Strategic upgrades of low-quality borrowers with multiple bank
relationships
Lenders to low-quality borrowers with multiple lenders may fear that the public
revelation of negative information to other lenders will cause a creditor run and
the ultimate default of the borrower. If this occurred, the bank revealing negative
information would suffer because the loan would be less likely to be repaid.
Therefore, banks may have an incentive to strategically upgrade multiple-lender
borrowers with a rating of two.
This is precisely what we find when we estimate the probability that a
borrower is upgraded from two to one in the multiple-lender subsample. Table 6
presents the results. Treatment borrowers, defined as borrowers that maintain
a rating of two and total loans below the $200,000 threshold in the period
preceding the announcement of the credit registry expansion, are more likely
to be upgraded in the interim period in comparison to borrowers in the control
sample, whose credit ratings were already public. The magnitude of the effects
in Column 1 is 8.9 percentage points. This magnitude is large compared with
the unconditional propensity to upgrade for this subsample of borrowers of 0.19
overall and 0.16 in the pre-announcement period. The effect is almost double in
Column 2 once we include borrower fixed effects.16 Consistent with our iden-
tification assumption, the abnormal propensity to upgrade treatment borrowers
with multiple lenders exists in the interim period, but not in the post-period.
Our argument that banks strategically upgrade borrowers with multiple
lenders to avoid creditor runs does not hinge on lenders’ private information.
Observing a negative rating, other lenders may revise upwards the probability
that the bank with negative rating will withdraw credit. We would therefore
expect all banks, not only local banks, to strategically upgrade their borrowers.
This is precisely what we find in Columns 3 and 5.
16 We include borrower fixed effects in the multiple lender sample to mitigate the concern that our results are due
to a handful of borrowers being upgraded by multiple lenders.
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Table 6
Strategic upgrades of low-quality borrowers by multiple lenders
Dependent variable Upgrades from 2 to 1
Sample lender Multiple 3-month post
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treated −0.030
(0.022)
Treated × Interim 0.089∗ 0.152∗∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.162∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.180∗∗
(0.051) (0.064) (0.071) (0.094) (0.111) (0.061) (0.074)
Treated × Post 0.096 0.103
(0.064) (0.099)
Treated × Interim × Local −0.034 −0.041
(0.130) (0.148)
Treated × Post × Local −0.014
(0.125)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Borrower controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Borrower fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-time fixed effects No No No No No Yes Yes
Industry-time fixed effects No No No No No Yes Yes
No. observations 2,365 2,365 2,365 2,365 2,365 2,365 1,240
R-sq. 0.11 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.66 0.59
This table presents the difference-in-differences effect of the registry expansion announcement (interim period)
and public information (post-expansion period) on upgrade hazard rates, estimated using OLS. Treatment
(control) borrowers are those with total debt between $150,000 and $200,000 ($200,000 and $250,000) during
the pre-announcement period (January to March 1998). The dependent variable, upgrade, is from rating = 2 to
rating = 1 (best). The sample is all treatment and control borrower-bank relationships with a rating = 1 in the
pre-announcement period for borrowers with multiple lending relationships in the pre-announcement period.
Columns (1) to (6) use a 12-month post-period horizon, while Column (7) uses a three-month post-period
horizon. Local is an indicator variable equal to one if the lender is a local bank. The unit of observation is
at the borrower-bank-month level. Bank controls include log(total assets), return on assets, capitalization (%),
log(number of branches), nonperforming loans-to-total assets, deposits-to-total assets, and growth on total assets,
while borrower controls include the log(debt), state, size, industry classification, and urban. Standard errors are
clustered at the borrower level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Finally, the strategic upgrades are not driven by bank or industry-specific
shocks as the results in Column 6 are robust to the inclusion of bank-time and
industry-time fixed effects. Column 7 further shows that our results are robust
when we use a three-month post-period.
Table IA.9 in the Internet Appendix provides futher robustness tests. If the
upgrades are indeed driven by fear that the revelation of negative information
may induce a creditor run, we should not observe a similar effect for borrowers
with which the bank entertains an exclusive relationship. This is precisely what
we find in Column 1. This is comforting because it further assuages concerns
that treated borrowers with a rating of 2 may be subject to positive shocks.
The finding in Column 1 is also important to dispel concerns that changes
in credit ratings are due to a systematic revision of all credit ratings aiming to
update information about the borrowers before sharing it with other financial
institutions. If the changes in ratings we observe were driven by a mere
incorporation of new information, we should observe that banks also upgrade
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some borrowers with whom they entertain single relationships. The fact that
this is not the case (together with our earlier evidence that cross-sectional
differences are consistent with theoretical predictions and the finding that credit
ratings become less informative) indicates that changes in ratings are not driven
by systematic revisions, but are instead strategic.
The rest of Table IA.9 presents a subsample analysis mimicking the one
in Table IA.5. The results in Columns 2 to 5 fully support our identifying
assumption. In Column 2, where we use a smaller set of borrowers around the
cutoff, thus limiting unobserved heterogeneity, the coefficient of Treatedi ×
Interimt increases with respect to the benchmark specification in Column 6 of
Table 6. The contrary is true in Column 3, where we use a larger set of borrowers
around the cutoff. Also, the effect of Treatedi × Interimt is not statistically
significant in the placebo tests, presented in Columns 4 and 5, where borrowers
with loan amounts strictly below and strictly above the cutoff are considered
in the estimation.
Consistent with the interpretation that the upgrades of low-quality borrowers
are strategic, panel A of Table 7 shows that the subsample of borrowers
with multiple lenders and a credit rating of one was better quality before the
announcement of the reform. Treatment group borrowers with a rating of one
have a lower probability of future default before the announcement of the
credit registry expansion than treatment group borrowers receiving the same
rating in the interim or the post-period, relative to the control group.17 Thus,
while the subsample of single-lender borrowers with a rating of two becomes
relatively better and the quality of single-lender borrowers with a rating of one
is invariant, the subsample of multiple-lender borrowers with a rating of one
becomes relatively worse.
Panel B of Table 7 explores whether the upgraded borrowers are marginal
borrowers. If the borrowers upgraded from the pools of twos were the relatively
better ones, the quality of multiple-lender borrowers with a rating of two should
decline post-manipulation. We find that the quality of borrowers of multiple
lenders with a rating of two is unchanged, on average, suggesting once again
that strategic upgrades occur across the board.18
This evidence parallels the findings on the probability of default in the
single borrower sample. There is a convergence in the probability of default
of borrowers with one and two ratings also in the multiple-lender subsample
as multiple-lender borrowers with a rating of one were less likely to default in
the pre-announcement period. Thus, also in this subsample ratings become less
informative.
17 Also, multiple-lender borrowers upgraded in the interim period are, on average, as likely to default as borrowers
that have not been upgraded, and the size of their loans remain unchanged.
18 Only the quality of single-lender borrowers with a rating of two improves after the reform, as shown in panel A
of Table 5.
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Table 7
Informativeness of multiple lenders credit ratings
A
Dependent variable Default
Sample lender Multiple and rating = 1
(1) (2)
Default horizon 6 Mths 12 Mths
Treated 0.020 0.032
(0.015) (0.022)
Treated × Pre −0.033∗∗ −0.025∗
(0.016) (0.015)
Bank controls Yes Yes
Borrower controls Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes




Sample lender Multiple and rating = 2
(1) (2)
Default horizon 6 Mths 12 Mths
Treated 0.015 0.017
(0.046) (0.072)
Treated × Pre −0.025 −0.070
(0.066) (0.077)
Bank controls Yes Yes
Borrower controls Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
No. observations 1,700 924
Adj. R-sq. 0.178 0.15
This table presents the difference-in-differences effect of the credit rating in the pre-announcement period on
default hazard rates for borrowers with a credit rating of 1, estimated using OLS. Treatment (control) borrowers
are those with total debt between $150,000 and $200,000 ($200,000 and $250,000) during the pre-announcement
period (January to March 1998). The dependent variable, Default, is an indicator variable equal to one if the
borrower’s credit rating worsens in the subsequent six-month period in Column (1) or 12-month period in
Column (2). In panel A, the sample is all treatment and control borrowers with a multiple lending relationships
in the pre-announcement period and with a rating = 1 in the current period. In panel B, the sample is all treatment
and control borrowers with a multiple lending relationships in the pre-announcement period and with a Rating =
2 in the current period. Bank controls include log(total assets), return on assets, capitalization (%), log(number
of branches), nonperforming loans-to-total assets, deposits-to-total assets, and growth on total assets, while
borrower controls include the log(debt), state, size, and urban. The unit of observation is at the borrower-bank-
month level. Standard errors are clustered at the borrower level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Taken jointly, our findings are fully consistent with the banks’ incentives to
manipulate information with the ultimate goal of maximizing their net wealth
and are difficult to explain with shocks affecting the treated borrowers but
not the control borrowers. For our results to be driven by negative shocks, it
would have to be that single-lender treatment borrowers with an initial rating
30
[16:40 17/6/2017 RFS-hhx050.tex] Page: 31 1–36
Information Sharing and Rating Manipulation
of one are more exposed to negative shocks than control borrowers, while the
contrary would have to hold for multiple-lender treatment borrowers with an
initial rating of two. This seems implausible given that treatment and control
are based on the same total outstanding loan threshold in the two subsamples.
4.3 Implications of information sharing on bank-borrower relationships
So far we have shown that banks strategically manipulate the ratings they can
discretionally assign to borrowers before sharing them in a way that is consistent
with their incentives. As a consequence, credit ratings become less informative
once it is known that they will be shared with other banks. This implies that only
garbled information is revealed. Is this information sufficiently informative to
affect bank-borrower relationships and the structure of loan contracts?
Table 8 provides some evidence on the effects of information sharing on the
structure of bank-borrower relationships. We estimate how the release of public
information affects the total debt and the composition of bank relationships on
the intensive and extensive margins in the post-reform period. For borrowers in
the treatment and control groups, we examine the number of bank relationships
and composition of debt by bank type across all relationships, not just those that
existed prior to the registry expansion. Panel A concentrates on borrowers that
had a single lender at the beginning of the sample period. The within-borrower
estimation results show that, on average, the total debt (Column 1) and the
number of relationships (Column 2) do not change.
However, following the credit registry expansion, the fraction of debt
provided by local banks to treatment borrowers decreases (Column 3), and
the fraction of debt provided by foreign banks increases (Column 4). Prior to
the expansion of the credit registry, on average, treatment borrowers sourced
63% of loans from local banks, while control borrowers, whose information
was already public, sourced just 41%. In contrast, treatment borrowers sourced
just 16% of debt from foreign banks, while control borrowers sourced 30%.
Post-expansion, foreign banks provided treatment borrowers 18% and control
borrowers 29% of their debt. Consequently, the results in Columns 3 and 4 in
panel A of Table 8 imply that the credit registry expansion provided greater
access to foreign funding, and that treated borrowers shifted debt away from
local lenders.
In Columns 3 and 4, we omit borrower fixed effects as there is very little
within-borrower variation in the composition of lenders over our short time
window. Nonetheless, we find similar results in Column 5 when we estimate
the within-borrower effect of public information about local bank lending.
One of the greatest frictions to new bank entry is adverse selection. This
friction is aggravated for transaction lenders, such as foreign banks. If the credit
registry mitigates this friction, we should observe that the decrease in local
bank lending (and increase in foreign bank lending) should be concentrated in
borrowers with the best credit ratings. Consistent with this, we split the sample
of single-lender borrowers based on whether the borrower has a credit rating
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Table 8
Information sharing and changes in bank lending relationships
A
Sample Single lender
All borrowers Rating = 1 Rating >1
log(total debt) log(#banks) % local % foreign % local % local % local
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treated × Post 0.021 −0.017 −0.032∗∗ 0.026∗ −0.015∗ −0.017∗ −0.005
(0.064) (0.025) (0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.005)
Borrower controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower fixed effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Industry-time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
fixed effects
No. observations 11,698 11,698 11,698 11,698 11,698 9,737 1,961
R-Sq. 0.57 0.68 0.44 0.24 0.99 0.99 0.99
B
Sample Multiple lender
All borrowers Rating = 1 Rating >1
log(total debt) log(#banks) % local % foreign % local % local % local
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treated × Post 0.009 0.044∗∗ −0.006 0.009 −0.008 −0.006 −0.002
(0.038) (0.018) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.023)
Borrower controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower fixed effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Industry-time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
fixed effects
No. observations 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 16,534 2,304
R-sq. 0.58 0.79 0.411 0.231 0.97 0.97 0.98
This table presents the difference-in-differences effect of public information (post-expansion period) on bank
lending-relationships. Treatment (control) borrowers are those with total debt between $150,000 and $200,000
($200,000 and $250,000) during the pre-announcement period (January to March 1998). In panels A and
B, the sample is all treatment and control borrowers with single and multiple lending relationships in the
pre-announcement period, respectively. Dependent variables are the log(total debt), the number of lending
relationships (log(#banks)), the fraction of lending relationships that are with local banks (% local), which
reflect relationship banks, and the fraction of lending relationships that are with foreign banks (% foreign),
which reflect transactional banks. The unit of observation is at the borrower-bank-month level. Columns (1) to
(5) include all borrowers; Column (6) includes borrowers that maintain a rating that equals one with all lenders;
and Column (7) includes those borrowers with at least one rating greater than one. Borrower controls include the
state, size, industry classification, and urban in Column (1) and log(total debt), state, size, industry classification,
and urban in Columns (2)-(7). The unit of observation is at borrower-month level. Standard errors are clustered
at the borrower level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
of one (Column 6) or greater than one (Column 7) and find that the shift in
borrowing away from local lenders is concentrated in the best borrowers.
Panel B concentrates on borrowers that had multiple bank relationships at
the beginning of the sample period. It appears that these borrowers are able to
start new relationships (Column 2). Possibly because the level of information
asymmetry was lower for borrowers that already engaged multiple banks in
the pre-announcement period, it does not appear that foreign banks take great
advantage of the public credit registry, as the share of loans provided by foreign
banks and by local banks does not change post-registry expansion.
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Table 9
Information manipulation and changes in bank lending relationships
Sample Single lender
Treatment borrowers w/rating = 1 in the pre-period
log(total debt) log(#banks) % local % foreign
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Downgraded × Post 0.055 −0.130∗ 0.021∗∗ −0.017∗
(0.176) (0.070) (0.010) (0.009)
Borrower controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower fixed effects Yes Yes No No
Industry-time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. observations 2,092 2,092 2,092 2,092
R-sq. 0.57 0.77 0.98 0.96
This table presents the difference-in-differences effect of public information (post-expansion period) on bank-
relationships for those borrowers that were strategically downgraded. Treatment borrowers are those with total
debt between $150,000 and $200,000 during the pre-announcement period (January to March 1998). The sample
is all treatment borrowers with single lending relationships and a rating that equals one in the pre-announcement
period. Dependent variables are the log(total debt), the number of relationships (log(#banks)), the fraction of
lending relationships that are with local banks (% local), which reflect relationship banks, and the fraction of
lending relationships that are with foreign banks (% foreign). The unit of observation is at the borrower-bank-
month level. Borrower controls include the state, size, industry classification, and urban in Column (1) and
log(total debt), state, size, industry classification, and urban in Columns (2)-(4). The unit of observation is at
borrower-month level. Standard errors are clustered at the borrower level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
These results indicate that the public credit registry increases bank
competition for lending to borrowers not previously included in the registry. The
competition takes the form of more credit from foreign banks for borrowers with
single lenders. The number of bank relationships of multiple-lender borrowers
also increases.
While overall the credit registry expansion may have advantaged transaction
banks at the expense of relationship banks, the strategic downgrades appear
to have been effective in preserving some of the rents of relationship banks.
This is evident in Table 9, which reproduces the results in panel A of Table 8
for the subsample of treated borrowers that had a rating of one in the pre-
announcement period. The interaction term Downgradedi ×Postt shows that
for borrowers that have been strategically downgraded in the interim period the
effects are opposite to the ones in panel A of Table 8. Downgraded borrowers
do not start new relationships at the same rate as nondowngraded borrowers,
which may explain why we find no effect on the number of new relationships
in panel A of Table 8. Strategically downgraded borrowers become more, not
less, dependent on local banks and receive less credit from foreign banks after
their ratings become public, indicating that rating manipulation impacts the
allocation of credit.19
19 Focusing on borrowers with multiple relationships and a rating of two in the pre-announcement period, we find
that the total loans of borrowers that have not been upgraded in the interim period decrease in the post-period. This
decrease suggests that a creditor run occurs for these borrowers and matches the findings of Hertzberg, Liberti
and Paravisini (2011). This finding also suggests that strategic upgrades achieve their objective of avoiding a
creditor run.
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5. Conclusion
We have provided evidence that banks manipulate credit ratings before sharing
them because of the extension of a public credit registry. Our findings are
important for the design of public credit registries. Policy makers often use these
tools for supervision, as well as for attempting to limit asymmetric information
between lenders and between borrowers and lenders. We highlight that making
borrowers’ rating public to other lenders may negatively affect the quality of
the information available for supervision.
Our findings are even more relevant in light of a debate on the design of
public credit registries that has accompanied the implementation of Basel II.
While the credit ratings that banks share with other lenders in public credit
registries typically are not the internal credit ratings used for Basel II capital
requirements, the possibility of sharing internal credit ratings has been widely
discussed (see, for instance, Powell et al. 2004; Hertig 2006).
Our results imply that such regulation could reinforce the incentives to report
manipulated ratings in a way that varies over the business cycles. To the extent
that fears of creditor runs are stronger when capital requirements are binding and
lending standards are expected to tighten, regulation requiring lenders to share
borrowers’ internal ratings would strengthen banks’ incentives to strategically
upgrade borrowers with multiple lenders.
In normal times, banks are willing to hold levels of capital well above
regulatory minimums (Flannery and Rangan 2008; Gropp and Heider 2010;
Allen, Carletti, and Marquez 2011). Even if the ratings shared in the registry
were the same as those used for Basel II, banks would still have an incentive
to strategically downgrade good borrowers if the capital requirements are
not binding. This is most likely during good times, when competitors are
likely to expand their loan portfolio and competition in the credit market is
stronger.
Our findings are also important for the growing debate on the use of credit
ratings following the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Existing literature indicates
the limitations arising from the issuer-pays model. We show that ratings are
manipulated in a situation in which the rater is the lender. This result has
implications for alternative models to disseminate information in financial
markets that have been considered after the financial crisis.
Following the enactment of the Dodd-FrankAct, insurance companies obtain
regulator-paid expected loss assessments from PIMCO and BlackRock to
compute their capital requirements. If PIMCO or BlackRock increase the
expected loss assessment, insurance companies are likely to sell in the same
way as creditors may withdraw their loans after observing a not so good
rating. Since PIMCO and Blackrock invest themselves in the securities they
assess, an increase in the expected loss assessment could prompt sales and
negatively feedback on the valuations of their holdings. Our results imply that
this alternative model to disseminate information is not immune from conflicts
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of interest because agents will behave strategically if they expect information
disclosure to feedback on their profits.
An important area of research would be to understand whether the incentives
to manipulate, which we have highlighted, are at work outside the banking
industry and public credit registries.
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